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YOUNGSTOWN, HAMDAN, AND “INHERENT” EMERGENCY
PRESIDENTIAL POLICYMAKING POWERS
GORDON G. YOUNG*
This is form gulping after formlessness . . . .
Wallace Stevens, The Auroras of Autumn.1
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of the Youngstown case,2 increasingly identified with
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion,3 is an example of law that has
been useful, but highly indeterminate, dominated more by its gaps
than by its structure, and is likely to be under construction long into
the future.  The rule-like portions of Jackson’s statements create pre-
sumptions that, by themselves, were insufficient to dictate the result in
Youngstown itself or in many likely future cases.  They resemble the
partially completed structure of a bridge, narrowing the possible end-
ing points, while leaving open a wide variety of possibilities.  It is from
this sketchy structure of premises that Jackson jumped, figuratively,
over a rather large gap in explicit reasoning, to the conclusion that
President Truman lacked power to take action.
To understand Youngstown’s likely implications for future cases, it
is necessary to speculate, based on inferences from Jackson’s opinion,
other opinions in Youngstown, and later Supreme Court cases, about
Copyright  2007 by Gordon G. Young.
* Marbury Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.  For
their very helpful comments on an earlier version of this Essay, I thank the other partici-
pants in our recent faculty workshop on Hamdan, whose essays appear in this Issue along
with mine, and also Richard Boldt, Mark Graber, and Matthew Laudano.
1. WALLACE STEVENS, The Auroras of Autumn, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE
STEVENS 411, 411 (1954).
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
3. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).  As for the status of Jackson’s opinion as a de
facto majority opinion, widely accepted as a starting place for analyzing the scope of presi-
dential policymaking powers, see infra Part II, in which I describe the use made of Jack-
son’s framework by a majority of Justices in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, who, together, invalidated
aspects of the military commission system established by President George W. Bush’s exec-
utive order.  126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800–01 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62, 668–69 (1981) (focusing on
Jackson’s Youngstown opinion in its analysis of presidential powers).  On the wider accept-
ance of Jackson’s opinion by judges and scholars as the crucial opinion in Youngstown, see
Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in The Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. L. REV.
1107 (2006).
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what law is crystallizing in the large interstices of Jackson’s framework.
The most recent set of opinions that add some concreteness to
Youngstown are those, together signed by five Justices, which sup-
ported the result in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.4 Hamdan considered the va-
lidity of various features of the military commission system created by
executive order to adjudicate claims to freedom made by detained en-
emy combatants.  Those five Justices read a federal statute to forbid a
commission so structured, and thus found that it was beyond the
power of the President to authorize.5
The central question in Youngstown was the lawfulness of Presi-
dent Truman’s seizure of steel mills in order to avert a possible materi-
als shortage during the Korean War.  Justice Jackson offered a very
general framework that has endured, as evidenced most recently by its
serving as the analytic starting point for the dispositive opinions in
Hamdan.  His opinion divides the world of presidential actions into
three parts: (1) actions authorized by Congress; (2) those neither au-
thorized nor prohibited by Congress; and (3) those prohibited by
Congress.6
It is the simplicity, malleability, and basic common sense of that
framework that has made Jackson’s opinion into something resem-
bling a de facto majority opinion.  And, to a large extent, the views of
the other Justices in Youngstown support this emphasis on Jackson’s
views. Several of the opinions in Youngstown, together joined by a ma-
jority of the other Justices, including dissenters, suggest agreement
with some of the large-scale features of Jackson’s views.  All of these
Justices apparently accepted (1) the absence of a clear answer in the
text of the Constitution to many questions of the proper division of
powers between Congress and the President, (2) the need for at least
some pragmatic flexibility in working out that division, and (3) the
importance of attempted statutory authorization or negation in deter-
mining the scope of presidential powers.7
4. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800–01 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
5. Id. at 2791–93 (majority opinion).
6. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
7. Both Justice Jackson and Justice Frankfurter recognized that some presidential
policymaking powers might exist in the absence of statutory authorization, at least in very
limited circumstances.  Frankfurter recognized both that presidential powers are not com-
pletely defined by simple, bright-line rules, and that they are highly dependent on histori-
cal context.  His formulations in this regard have some flexibility in common with views as
emphasized in Jackson’s opinion, though they are different in particulars. Id. at 596–98,
610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting openness to the possibility of temporary
emergency powers in the absence of a prohibiting statute or of powers established by long-
standing implicit acquiescence of Congress).
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Thus the features of Jackson’s opinion that make it broadly at-
tractive are precisely those that render it highly indeterminate.  Its
rule-like portions combine form and formlessness: a clear division
into categories, with the significance of inclusion in a particular cate-
gory substantially unspecified.  In Youngstown, the content—rules de-
termining the existence and scope of inherent presidential
policymaking powers in each of the categories—must be inferred
from the circumstances of surrounding doctrine, the structure of
Youngstown and later cases invoking it, and subtle suggestions in the
language of various opinions in those cases. Hamdan is such a clarify-
ing case.  And yet its lessons, as with Youngstown itself, come less from
formally articulated rules in the two main opinions than from infer-
ences to be drawn from various observations made by the Justices and
from surrounding circumstances.
I. YOUNGSTOWN
A. Jackson’s Opinion
What Jackson’s opinion tells us about the significance of a case’s
location in his framework is this: in the first set of cases, where presi-
dential powers are authorized by statute, they are at a maximum; in
the third, where Congress prohibits such powers, they are at a mini-
Like Jackson, Frankfurter found a negation, by prior statute, of the powers claimed by
the President and thought that it precluded presidential policymaking, at least in a largely
domestic sphere. Id. at 601–02.  Justice Burton, concurring, also stressed the lack of com-
pliance with existing statutory provisions for seizure and noted the absence of a cata-
strophic situation. Id. at 657–60 (Burton, J., concurring).  Justice Clark, concurring,
concluded that the President must not transgress statutory limits, but that, absent statutory
restriction, the President has some power to confront emergencies, depending on their
gravity. Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring).
Unlike the four concurring Justices, the dissenters (Chief Justice Vinson, joined by
Justices Reed and Minton) found no express congressional negation of presidential powers
to deal with the strike and found support for President Truman’s actions in other laws
enacted to support the Korean military effort. Id. at 668–72, 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
That opinion suggests the existence of presidential power to meet emergencies, at least a
temporary power (existing until Congress can itself respond), to preserve existing federal
enterprises authorized by statute. Id. at 672, 701–03.  The dissent also decries the major-
ity’s treatment of the President as having no independent authority (metaphorically as
Congress’s constitutional “messenger-boy”) to confront even a grave emergency until Con-
gress can act. Id. at 708–09.
Thus, while differing in a number of ways, four concurring Justices and three dissent-
ing ones at the very least leave open the possibility of emergency policymaking powers in
some circumstances and at least recognize the potential significance of a congressional
negation of such a claimed power.  It is in these respects that Jackson’s opinion is a major-
ity opinion as to the broad outlines of limits on presidential policymaking power.  While
not great and specific, the agreement among these concurring and dissenting Justices is far
from meaningless.
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mum; and in the second, where no statute governs them, they are in
some middling state.8  These are more than statistical predictions
made about the likelihood of sustaining any specifically claimed presi-
dential power before examining its particular merits. Youngstown and
later cases such as Hamdan make clear that they are also to be under-
stood as reflecting presumptions of validity or invalidity, depending
on whether and to what extent presidential action is in or out of phase
with statutory law.9
Under judicial interpretations of separation of powers, Congress
has now, and had at the time of Youngstown, enormous discretion to
make statutory delegations of policymaking power to the President
and to executive branch officers serving under him.10  Thus, executive
policymaking powers in Jackson’s first category, those authorized by
statute, rarely will be constitutionally problematic.  Invalidity will oc-
cur only in circumstances in which (1) such a delegation transgresses
the skimpy limits on transferring legislative power, or (2) the power,
as transferred, violates some separate doctrine or textual provision of
the Constitution, such as other aspects of separation of powers or
some provision of the Bill of Rights.  Given these doctrinal circum-
stances, Jackson’s statement about the first category is little more than
a confirmation of the obvious.
The portions of Jackson’s framework that are at all interesting
involve his second and third categories.  Here, the suggestion is that
some presidential powers may exist when they have not been prohib-
ited by statute, and even some may exist despite a statute that attempts
to rule them out.  Each of his categories is a set of presidential powers,
and Jackson never commits absolutely to the second and third sets as
having many members.11
8. Id. at 635–39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
9. Jackson contrasts the “flexible tests” of the second category with the “severe tests”
of the third. Id. at 639–40.  This contrast suggests that doctrine exists, or will be developed,
for determining when presidential action is valid and that such doctrine should strongly
disfavor, but not necessarily rule out, presidential action in the third category.  This is a
doctrinal commitment, though one of uncertain specific content, rather than simply a
prediction.
10. Since the late 1930s, the Supreme Court has upheld extremely broad delegations
of policymaking power to the executive branch. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 420, 426–27 (1944) (allowing an administrator very broad powers to fix maximum
prices and rents across wide-ranging parts of the economy); see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 71 (6th ed. 2006).
11. Jackson does recognize, though, that the Court had found that the power to re-
move certain executive officials is implicitly vested exclusively in the President. Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 638 n.4 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926)).
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But this depends on what we count as members.  Indeed if we
confine discussion to inherent policymaking powers, only vaguely in-
ferable from the constitutional text and structure, Jackson may be
read as not committing to the presence of any such powers in the
latter two categories.  And broad powers, tenuously justified by the
vesting of the executive power in the President or by virtue of his posi-
tion as Commander in Chief are my focus.  It is worth recognizing that
Jackson never makes a distinction between these latter sorts of power
and others in his initial statements creating his tripartite framework of
powers of varying presumptive validity.
In those most rule-like passages of his opinion, he simply dis-
cusses presidential “powers” or “authority” without further qualifica-
tion.12  So, for example, it is possible that he is referring to (1) powers
expressly specified, or strongly implied, by constitutional text (e.g.,
pardon power, power to direct troops as Commander in Chief, and
limited control of policy embodied in the veto), as well as to (2) possi-
ble inherent powers more vaguely traceable to constitutional text,
structure, and history.  On this view, then, it is trivially true that there
are powers not limitable by statute and that even some of those shape
policy (e.g., the presidential veto).
But the interesting questions surrounding Youngstown and later
cases have always been those of the existence of non-express or inher-
ent presidential policymaking powers not fairly clearly and directly en-
tailed by explicit grants.  Justice Black’s opinion in Youngstown,
formally the majority opinion, alone among all in the case rules these
out clearly and completely, at least in some sufficiently domestic
sphere.13  What can we infer from Jackson’s opinion about the actual
or probable existence of these sorts of powers?
12. Id. at 635–38.  It is later in the opinion that he explicitly addresses so-called “inher-
ent powers.” Id. at 649–55.
13. Id. at 585, 588–89 (majority opinion).  I agree with the views expressed in my col-
league Peter Quint’s essay in this Quartet, that it is too simplistic to see Youngstown as a
purely domestic case, not implicating foreign policy or military affairs.  Peter E. Quint,
Silences and Peculiarities of the Hamdan Opinions, 66 MD. L. REV. 772, 773 (2007).  The ques-
tion is always one of degree of relationship to foreign or military affairs and the signifi-
cance of each such relationship to the existence of presidential powers. See infra note 17. R
Jackson seems to have found the relationship of the President’s Commander-in-Chief pow-
ers and the seizure of the steel mills rather tenuous. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643–44
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“There are indications that the Constitution did not contem-
plate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Com-
mander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.”).  So in a real emergency
more directly central to a war, perhaps, the calculus of powers would be different.  But
note that Jackson thought that Congress had great control even over indisputably military
affairs: “He has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’ whatever they are.” Id. at 644.
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Jackson makes clear that Youngstown was a third category case,
one in which Congress had attempted to negate any presidential
power to create and then enforce a seizure policy such as President
Truman’s.14  He finds, in the combined implications of several en-
acted laws, a statutory prohibition of presidential seizure of the mills
under the circumstances existing in Youngstown.15  So, presidential
power was “at a minimum.”  From here, Jackson makes the sort of leap
to a conclusion that I described at the beginning of this Essay: he finds
that no such power existed.  Is this because no such power ever exists?
Or is it because of unarticulated rules (as he calls them “severe
tests”)16 limiting to a small sphere presidential power asserted against
statutory restrictions?
From the trajectory of the leap in Jackson’s opinion, can we learn
anything that suggests unarticulated or developing principles or as-
sumptions that would help determine when presidential powers are
likely to exist in the second and third categories?  He offers clues, but
nothing definitive.  After placing Youngstown in the third category, he
examines several specific textual grants to the President and finds that
none of these, either clearly or by reasonable inference, confers such
powers on the President.  It is fairly clear that, like Black, Jackson
would not find that the President has any very general inherent legis-
lative power to make policy, at least in some sufficiently domestic and
nonmilitary sphere.17  So, had Congress never regulated railroads, it is
clear that the President could not, by executive order, comprehen-
sively regulate them, at least in the absence of some true emergency,
as discussed below.  But this is not at all controversial and still leaves
14. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 639.  Other Justices, concurring in Youngstown, reach a similar conclusion.
And a majority of opinions necessary to the result see some form of congressional negation
as significantly reducing the plausibility of presidential claims to power. See id. at 602
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (giving strong, and most likely conclusive, effect to statutory
negations of presidential powers); id. at 657–59 (Burton, J., concurring) (same); id. at
662–63 (Clark, J., concurring) (same).  Even the Youngstown dissenters recognize the possi-
bility that negations may limit inherent powers in some circumstances. Id. at 702 (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  Emergency policies, like all policies, al- R
most always have some connection, however infinitesimal, middling, or great, with military
matters and foreign affairs.  At some point, the connection might be seen as sufficiently
tenuous to classify the problem as “domestic.”  Such an approach would arbitrarily mark
off a border between domestic affairs and these special areas of presidential concern and
apply presumptions of different strength on each side.  Another approach would see these
considerations on a continuum, on which the connections with military matters and for-
eign affairs is given whatever (often small, sometimes negligible) weight that it should have
in interpolating inherent presidential powers in particular circumstances.
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emergency powers to be considered.  Yet even as to these, Jackson is
not a devotee: “Such power either has no beginning or it has no end.
If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint.  I am not alarmed that
it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step
in that wrong direction.”18
But, examined more closely, what he rejects most clearly are “in-
herent and unrestricted” emergency powers.19  And given his premises,
his objection might be limited to the exertion of emergency powers at
a time when Congress is available to deal with the emergency by
means of a law presented to the President.  At one point Jackson says:
“In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and
has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this
crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should af-
firm possession of them without statute.”20
Perhaps the opening qualification about Congress’s availability
has real significance.  One can read this passage as open to the possi-
bility of emergency powers in the second category where statutes
neither authorize nor forbid a particular emergency policy.  What if
Congress itself were closed by an emergency, a state of affairs that
seems less than fanciful today in a world of nuclear proliferation and
biological warfare?  And what of the analogous, but much shorter
time frame, in an extreme crisis when a generally functioning Con-
gress may take days to deal with a matter that can become critical in
hours, perhaps minutes.
Let us imagine a temporary bird flu quarantine imposed by a
President until Congress can pass legislation, under circumstances
where no preexisting statutory framework exists.  One can read Jack-
son as at least open to the possibility of such inherent powers through
a possible negative implication in the passage of his opinion quoted
immediately above.  And certainly other Justices in Youngstown are
open to this possibility.21
In times of emergency, a functioning Congress might reasonably
be seen as a critical, limiting assumption of the usual division and
sharing of responsibility between the President and the legislative pro-
cess, a division that normally requires legislative policymaking and
presidential supervision of its execution within his branch.  Recogniz-
18. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653 (Jackson, J. concurring).
19. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 653 (emphasis added).  “Without statute” suggests that Jackson might well
rule out such powers in cases resembling Youngstown and in many others, even in his sec-
ond category, in which relevant statutes are silent.
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
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ing an emergency exception to this usual division of powers is within
the more permissive reading of Jackson’s opinion.  Alternatively, of
course, one may read Jackson as completely rejecting all emergency
inherent powers fairly characterized as domestic and nonmilitary.
Let us first consider the latter, the strictest reading of Jackson.
On this view, without statutory authorization, presidential policymak-
ing powers are at a minimum because they are entirely limited to the
more explicit ones granted in the Constitution.  So the pardon power
is in the third category, and even there, it would survive attempted
statutory negation.  And many decisions of the Commander in Chief
need no advance authorization, though it is possible that some might
be negated by statute.  On this second reading of Jackson, in order to
be constitutional, any sort of policymaking initiative, even in the grav-
est emergency, must be made by an executive officer acting under
some authority that Congress has delegated.  In such dire situations, a
President’s best decision may be an unconstitutional one made in the
hope of a later statutory ratification.  And at times Jackson’s opinion
tends strongly toward this strict view.  At one point he says: “The Exec-
utive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative
power.”22
On the surface, this alone might seem enough to decide Youngs-
town.  But I think that Jackson’s opinion is more one of ambivalence,
occasionally approaching contradiction, than one of resolution.23  If
he had relied on this point, his opinion would have been functionally
identical to Justice Black’s in crucial respects; the absence of statutory
authority would decisively rule out presidential policymaking author-
ity.  There would have been no need to find statutory negation.
Jackson’s opinion seems much more elaborate and open-textured
than it would be were he absolutely sure that there are no presidential
powers to initiate domestic policy save pursuant to statutory delega-
tion.  And his previously mentioned reference to Congress’s availabil-
ity to deal with any emergency suggests that he might be open to the
first, much more permissive, of the two possibilities just discussed—
that of special presidential powers for emergencies.  And so Jackson’s
ambiguity (reflecting, I think, his ambivalence) leaves us with a range
of possible readings of his opinion.
22. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).
23. On this view, Jackson’s opinion was in a sense simply the latest and best draft of his
not completely gelled ideas published out of necessity, in a line of prior evolving drafts. See
White, supra note 3, at 1123–26, 1133. R
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B. Some Initial Thoughts About Emergency Powers
But, even if we resolve Jackson’s opinion to deny emergency pow-
ers, it does not definitively decide these questions, not even were we to
treat it as the opinion of the Court to be followed until overruled.
Today a court would have to reconsider these matters seriously, giving
Jackson’s, and other Youngstown opinions, whatever weight they war-
rant as to a situation not before the Justices at that time—an emer-
gency that made timely congressional response impossible.  One
problem is INS v. Chadha.24  Under its rules, as they apparently would
extend to this scenario of legislative capacity lost then regained, a ne-
gation of emergency powers would have to take the form of a full-
blown statute, meaning it would take a two-thirds vote of both houses
to override such emergency powers, except in the unlikely circum-
stances in which a President signed a law limiting his own powers.
This could unbalance the normal separation of powers long after an
emergency.  It would impart, to any prudentially necessary, “tempo-
rary” President-made policy, a momentum that would be hard for
Congress to resist long after its justification expired.
As a counter to this drawback of reading into the Constitution
short-term presidential emergency policymaking powers, there are
two possibilities (not mutually exclusive) that would deprive Congress
of no more of its ordinary control, by a majority vote of both houses,
than is necessary to deal with an emergency while it exists.  First, any
inherent power would expire with the end of the emergency, a fact
that could be left ultimately to the courts.  Consequently, there would
be no powers to negate outside of the emergency, during its existence,
or at all, after its termination.
Second, Chadha might be seen as not applying to this very special
constitutional situation in which the President is permitted legislative
power without an approval of the House and Senate as part of the
legislative process.  Perhaps to the extent that the President can act on
his own in an emergency to which Congress cannot respond, then a
functioning Congress should be able to terminate that power via a
concurrent resolution, which is subject to no presidential veto.
Arguably, part of the justification for rejecting the legislative veto
as an illegitimate ex post check on the scope of the executive action in
Chadha was the existence of an ex ante legislative check.  This took the
24. 462 U.S. 919, 952–59 (1983) (concluding that the Constitution generally forbids
the House and the Senate, either separately or together (but without presentment to the
President for signing or veto), to alter legal rights, duties, and the content of law
generally).
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form of Congress’s fashioning the limits of the statute that authorized
the executive action involved in Chadha.  Hence the form, if not the
true substance, of most executive action of a policymaking sort (to
take the clearest example, administrative rulemaking) was seen as that
of execution of the law, the law providing the authority.25  But, our
present concern is with statutorily unauthorized presidential poli-
cymaking powers.  As to such powers, by hypothesis, the President is
acting solely on his own asserted constitutional authority.  Thus he is
not executing a statutory delegation which would necessarily be lim-
ited in ways prescribed by Congress in advance of his action.  And so,
even if one agrees with Chief Justice Burger’s formalistic arguments
(and I do not), they seem not to speak to the best reading of the terms
on which presidential emergency power should be interpolated from
the Constitution alone.
In such circumstances, it seems to me that there is room to inter-
polate a compensating power of congressional (not statutory) veto.  As
to these inherent presidential powers, often only an ex post check is
practically possible.  So perhaps Chadha should be clarified and lim-
ited so as not to extend to ex post two-house negations of these sorts
of powers.  It seems natural to view the law of emergency presidential
powers as much more focused on necessity and interbranch balance,
rather than on the meaning of any particular piece of text.  A constitu-
tional calculus of checks seems an entirely appropriate consideration
in the Court’s inevitable choice of the shape of this sort of textually
underdetermined law.
Let us now consider the recent Hamdan opinion which applies
Youngstown to strike certain aspects of President Bush’s military com-
mission plan for the trials of enemy combatants.  To what extent does
Hamdan offer further guidance as to inherent presidential powers and
as to the significance of a military context or emergency context to
their existence and scope?  While Hamdan did not consider a legisla-
ture-incapacitating emergency, some of its language might be seen as
indicating openness on this score.
II. HAMDAN
A. Youngstown in Hamdan
The two opinions that are, together, signed by five Justices sup-
porting the result in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld resolve the case based on
25. Id. at 953–54 n.16 (arguing that legislative-style action by executive officers, author-
ized by statute, should be seen as execution of the law and not as legislation).
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Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework.26  This is most clear in Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, which explicitly invokes, and then applies, Jackson’s
framework in resolving the case.  These Justices interpret two federal
statutory provisions to prohibit several features of the military commis-
sion plan devised and deployed by President Bush.  This conclusion
places Hamdan in “Justice Jackson’s third category, not the second or
first.”27  Consequently, the jumping off point (to continue the meta-
phor of an incomplete bridge that started this Essay) is the assump-
tion of these four Justices that the President’s power is at a minimum.
Most of the other dispositive opinion, by Justice Stevens, was the
majority opinion, which was signed as well by Justices Kennedy, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  In Stevens’s opinion, all five of these Jus-
tices voted to strike certain portions of the military commission
structure.28  That opinion, if not expressly, then almost as clearly, de-
ploys Justice Jackson’s analysis. Youngstown is referred to only in a
footnote, but the note makes reference to Jackson’s opinion and says:
“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent con-
gressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own
war powers, placed on his powers.  The Government does not argue
otherwise.”29
26. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006); id. at 2800–01 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part).
27. Id. at 2800–02, 2807–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
28. Id. at 2792–93, 2798 (majority opinion).  Justice Kennedy further elaborated on
this reasoning in his concurrence:
These structural differences between the military commissions and courts-
martial—the concentration of functions, including legal decisionmaking, in a sin-
gle executive official; the less rigorous standards for composition of the tribunal;
and the creation of special review procedures in place of institutions created and
regulated by Congress—remove safeguards that are important to the fairness of
the proceedings and the independence of the court.  Congress has prescribed
these guarantees for courts-martial; and no evident practical need explains the
departures here.  For these reasons the commission cannot be considered regu-
larly constituted under United States law and thus does not satisfy Congress’ re-
quirement that military commissions conform to the law of war.
Id. at 2807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).  Justice Kennedy did not join parts of Justice
Stevens’s opinion.  He refused to decide the constitutionality of certain issues that were
resolved against the Bush Administration by Stevens and by the Justices joining Parts I and
II of Kennedy’s concurrence. Compare id. at 2775–86, 2797–98 (majority opinion), with id.
at 2800–01, 2808–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
29. Id. at 2774 n.23 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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Justice Stevens’s opinion then proceeds to find various features of
the commissions’ structure unconstitutional, relying strongly on con-
clusions that two provisions of a federal statute prohibit them.30  Thus
his opinion implicitly, but clearly, deploys Jackson’s general frame-
work, giving powerful negative significance to statutory negation.  And
recall that the four Justices who join Stevens’s opinion explicitly en-
dorse Youngstown as the governing framework in Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, which expressly invokes Youngstown.
But the qualifier in the passage from Stevens’s opinion appearing
immediately above—that Congress can negate presidential military
power “in proper exercise of its own war powers”—leaves open when a
limitation is “proper,” or to phrase it differently, it leaves open just
when a claimed presidential power is negatable by statute and when a
President’s power is insulated even from statutory limitation.  Stevens
finds that the presidential actions that he invalidates in Hamdan have
no constitutional support in the teeth of a statute prohibiting them.31
As with Jackson’s Youngstown opinion, we are left to guess about other
circumstances and other cases.  What, if any, presidential policymak-
ing powers would survive a statute that is read by the Court to prohibit
them?  How will the line be drawn in future cases between powers that
can be negated and those, if any, that cannot?  Neither Stevens nor
Kennedy provide guidelines, but they do provide clues worth explor-
ing below.
Justice Kennedy’s disagreement is solely as to the necessity of
finding unconstitutional some, but not all, of the features that would
be struck under Stevens’s opinion.32 As to the power of Congress, by
statute, to control many of the features of the commission system,
Kennedy agrees that “[t]he [Uniform Code of Military Justice] condi-
tions the President’s use of military commissions on compliance [with
a variety of requirements].  The procedures that the Government has
decreed will govern Hamdan’s trial by commission violate these
laws.”33
30. Id. at 2779–80, 2785–86 (concluding that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000), prohibits commission trial of a conspiracy charge
through its incorporation of the law of war); id. at 2786–93, 2798 (concluding that some of
the procedures and structural features of the commissions, as constituted by executive or-
der, are inconsistent with the UCMJ).
31. Id. at 2786, 2791–92.
32. Id. at 2808–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).  Justices Souter, Breyer, and Gins-
burg do not join this part, Part III, of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 2799.
33. Id. at 2786 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).  This portion of Stevens’s opin-
ion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Compare:
In sum, as presently structured, Hamdan’s military commission exceeds the
bounds Congress has placed on the President’s authority in §§ 836 and 821 of the
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-3\MLR307.txt unknown Seq: 13  4-MAY-07 13:53
2007] YOUNGSTOWN, HAMDAN, AND POLICYMAKING POWERS 799
Thus all five Justices agree with a Jacksonian method of analysis
that places great weight on congressional negation of inherent poli-
cymaking powers claimed by a President.  From this common doctri-
nal assumption, they leap to the joint conclusion that several features
of the commission plan are constitutionally flawed.  In this respect
they resemble Youngstown itself.  No algorithm is given for determin-
ing the President’s “minimal” policy-initiating powers that survive a
statutory negation.  Perhaps they are so minimal as to be non-existent,
the few powers surviving a negation being those given expressly by
constitutional text, such as the pardon power.
But is it possible that such inherent policymaking powers are few,
rather than nonexistent, and that the powers exercised as to the com-
missions simply are not among the few?  While no clear formula is
given for sorting out cases, there are suggestions in the Stevens and
Kennedy opinions that might be seen as narrowing the analytical gap
between placement of a presidential power in the third category and a
finding that its exercise is unconstitutional.  Let us focus on clues as to
two matters: first, the significance of a military context to the validity
of inherent powers and second, indications in the opinion of a possi-
ble openness to inherent powers for especially compelling
emergencies.
B. What Hamdan Suggests About the Significance of a Military
Context to Application of Jackson’s Framework
A crude, but useful, first cut at understanding Youngstown might
see it as indicating that, even if its framework applies to presidential
actions directly connected with military and foreign affairs, the skepti-
cism of inherent presidential powers suggested by the language and
results of various opinions may be lessened in such areas.34  At one
point Jackson says: “There are indications that the Constitution did
not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its
industries and its inhabitants.”35  This suggests stringent limits on
presidential regulation of nonmilitary activities within the United
UCMJ.  Because Congress has prescribed these limits, Congress can change them,
requiring a new analysis consistent with the Constitution and other governing
laws.  At this time, however, we must apply the standards Congress has provided.
By those standards the military commission is deficient.
Id. at 2808 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
34. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
35. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–44 (1952).
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States, even if somewhat in furtherance of congressionally approved
American military efforts abroad.
Hamdan displays a similar skepticism of a President’s ability to ig-
nore statutes that more directly implicate military operations.  Por-
tions of Justice Stevens’s opinion, concurred in by four Justices
including Justice Kennedy, make clear Congress’s dominance of poli-
cymaking in basic division of powers even as to matters centrally con-
cerning the military:
The Constitution makes the President the “Commander
in Chief” of the Armed Forces, but vests in Congress the pow-
ers to “declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water,” to “raise and support Armies,” to “de-
fine and punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations,”
and “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces.”36
Especially powerful is the very next passage from Stevens’s
Hamdan opinion, which approvingly quotes Chief Justice Chase’s
opinion in Ex parte Milligan:37
The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to
execute in the President.  Both powers imply many subordinate
and auxiliary powers.  Each includes all authorities essential
to its due exercise.  But neither can the President, in war
more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of
Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the
President. . . .  Congress cannot direct the conduct of cam-
paigns, nor can the President, or any commander under
him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for
the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or
civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity, which justifies
what it compels, or at least insures acts of indemnity from the
justice of the legislature.38
Together, these passages seem a rebuke, however softly worded,
to the Bush Administration’s broad and tenuous claims of power to
make policy after September 11, 2001, with little or no statutory au-
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773 (citations omitted).  Jackson makes a similar point in
Youngstown, though not in a majority opinion: “He has no monopoly of ‘war powers,’
whatever they are.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 644.
37. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
38. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773–74 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 139–40 (Chase,
C.J., concurring)).
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thority or even in apparent tension with acts of Congress.39  Certainly
they suggest the existence of little or no general presidential authority
over military affairs in the teeth of a statute to the contrary.  The argu-
able exception, once again, is an especially compelling emergency,
which is what I take a “controlling necessity” to mean in the passage
from Ex parte Milligan quoted immediately above.  Perhaps such an
exception may exist and extend beyond the battlefield in truly unu-
sual circumstances.
Justice Breyer’s opinion for four Justices also strongly suggests
both that, even as to military affairs, policymaking is almost always for
Congress, but also that there might be an exception for emergencies.
It too seems aimed at offering the executive a strong reminder of Con-
gress’s role:
Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to
create military commissions of the kind at issue here.  Noth-
ing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority he believes necessary.
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Con-
gress, judicial insistence upon that consultation does not
weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the con-
trary, that insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to deter-
mine—through democratic means—how best to do so.  The
Constitution places its faith in those democratic means.  Our
Court today simply does the same.40
III. SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS CONCERNING TRUE EMERGENCY
POWERS, EX ANTE STATUTORY NEGATION, AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
As my colleague Professor Singer has elaborated in her essay, con-
stitutional concerns about presidential powers under Youngstown tend
to be displaced and transformed into arguments about whether partic-
ular instances of presidential action are authorized by statute.41  Read-
ing a statute to provide authorization for a presidential action moves
any such action into Jackson’s first category, making it the beneficiary
of a strong presumption of constitutionality.  And, as always, a Justice
who finds a policy wise under particular circumstances, is more likely
39. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Setting The World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350,
2355–56, 2367 (2006).
40. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
41. Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD. L. REV. 759, 759–61
(2007).
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to find it authorized by an ambiguous statute that generally addresses
those circumstances and clearly confers some powers to make policy.
My focus here remains emergencies that must be dealt with in
some way before Congress can act.42  As should be apparent from ear-
lier parts of this Essay, I believe that such very limited presidential
powers should be recognized, but also limited by judicial review of the
scope and termination of the emergency and hence of the limits of
the power.  I take this position with some reluctance in light of what I
believe have been the abuses of the Bush Administration and the
great concern that they naturally cause.43  But unless one’s views of
the separation of powers validly vary from administration to adminis-
tration (depending on one’s views of their policies, ethics, and compe-
tence) one must take a longer, if not eternal view. Let me attempt to
take such a longer view.  It seems to me that a grave emergency, which
would otherwise occur in a power vacuum, must be met.  It would be
better to recognize the constitutionality of the President’s doing so,
rather than simply offer hope of ex post ratification by statute.44
Under the more rigid view, action by Congress is always required.
Under the former view, a greater presidential flexibility is recognized
and controlled by collaboration between Congress and the courts.
This suggests to me one last possibility worth exploring.  Perhaps
an ex ante statutory prohibition should not always be an effective ne-
gation of emergency powers even though an ex post negation should
be decisive.  There are a variety of reasons for considering this possi-
bility.  Such reasons stem from the fact that, by definition, such emer-
gency powers would last only during that time when the legislature is
not able to deliberate—specifically to change its “mind”—as such an
emergency unfolds in detail.  There are two elements to the rest of the
argument.  First, any statutory description of what is prohibited must
be more general than any full description of a particular emergency.
In responding to this problem one might resort to flexible statutory
42. “Must” masks the necessity of making many judgments and of much balancing.  At
some point the costs of waiting for statutory authorization simply become too great.  I
believe that, ultimately, the Supreme Court should make this judgment in each case, giving
whatever weight to various judgments made by other branches as to whether an emergency
ever existed, whether it continues, and if so, its scope.
43. To paraphrase Justice Jackson writing in another context, documenting my views
on this subject either has no beginning or virtually no ending.  My conclusions rest on what
I see as irresponsible actions and rhetoric, including misplanning for and conduct of the
war in Iraq, and a lack of regard for human rights and traditional values of American
constitutional government.  On this, I offer one article in a sea of thoughtful statements.
See Koh, supra note 39. R
44. For an example of an effective ratification of presidential action assumed, arguendo,
to be unauthorized, see The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670–71 (1863).
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interpretation to argue that what the statute prohibits does not con-
template this particular emergency, even though the latter meets the
statutory description in very general terms.
But there is a more fundamental point.  Even if one assumes that
the statute was meant to prohibit just this sort of presidential action in
just this sort of emergency, the legislative decision was made as an
abstraction when the emergency was not real.  If one sees the ability of
a legislature to change its “mind” (whose “mind,” I note, is differently
constituted as members come and go) as key to a proper negation,
then for negations for emergencies that must be met before Congress
can act, there is a strong and interesting argument that negations
must be ex post.45  Of course in reviewing any such asserted presiden-
tial emergency power, a preexisting statute that seems aimed at negat-
ing certain powers in future situations would not be irrelevant, even
under the view we are considering.  Often it might have real weight, as
a political branch input, on the question of whether a situation before
the court is a grave emergency that cannot await congressional action.
But weight is different from conclusiveness.  And I believe there are
strong arguments that such statutes should not be conclusive.
CONCLUSION
Catastrophic emergencies aside, perhaps the “formless” qualities
of Youngstown are in the process of taking on more shape.  Given the
balance of current Justices’ views, it appears that, not only must the
President make policy domestically in accordance with statutory law,
but also that most of the rules governing the military are subject to the
same statutory control.  The tradition of civilian control of the military
seems, at the level of constitutional law, to have the corollary of con-
trol by the most widely democratic process—the legislative process.46
Perhaps foreign affairs remains an area with yet unexplored spaces for
inherent presidential policymaking, and perhaps that area has space
for some actions not subject to negation by statute.  As for cata-
45. Some support for this position might be found in the Youngstown dissent.  Chief
Justice Vinson cites United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), as a case approving
presidential emergency policymaking, though contrary to an express prior statute.  Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 703 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Frankfurter had a very different view of Midwest.  Id. at 611–12 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).  And there are other readings of Midwest that would read the “prior statute”
as not negating the power exercised by the President that was the focus of Midwest.
If I am inclined to agree with Vinson on the larger point—that some emergency pow-
ers cannot be negated in advance—I am not inclined to agree with his view that Midwest
presented the sort of emergency as to which a prior prohibition should be ineffective.
46. Quint, supra note 13, at 775–76. R
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strophic emergencies—those in which, for a while, effective control by
legislation is impossible—the Constitution should be read realistically
to permit action by the President, but also to provide an effective sys-
tem of post-emergency congressional and judicial checks.
